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Abstract  
Recent progress in artificial intelligence (AI) using deep 
learning techniques has triggered its wide-scale use across a 
broad range of applications.   These systems can already 
perform tasks such as natural language processing of voice 
and text, visual recognition, question-answering, recom-
mendations and decision support.  However, at the current 
level of maturity, the use of an AI component in mission-
critical or safety-critical applications can have unexpected 
consequences.  Consequently, serious concerns about relia-
bility, repeatability, trust, and maintainability of AI applica-
tions remain. As AI becomes pervasive despite its short-
comings, more systematic ways of approaching AI software 
development and certification are needed. These fundamen-
tal aspects establish the need for a discipline on “AI engi-
neering”. This paper presents the current perspective of rel-
evant AI engineering concepts and some key challenges that 
need to be overcome to make significant progress in this 
important area. 
I.  Introduction 
In the past decade, AI has become a part of our daily lives.  
Whether it is searching on Google or personal recommen-
dations on Amazon or Netflix or Facebook, a deep learning 
(DL) model is working in the background.  This is made 
even more obvious in the use of devices like Ama-
zon/Alexa or Apple/Siri or Google/Home since they are 
physical manifestations of the human-machine interactions. 
While these systems are clearly impressive in what they 
have come to achieve, the consequence of mistakes by 
these systems are relatively minor. 
 Now let us consider the examples where mistakes can 
have a more severe social consequence: In 2016, Microsoft 
launched an experimental AI chat bot, called Tay.  The bot 
‘learned’ from interactions with users on Twitter and had 
to be shut down just a day after deployment because of its 
obscene and inflammatory tweets [1]. There have been 
many documented cases when the AI systems inherited 
various biases (racial, gender, age, etc.) [2].  AI is also 
prominent in self-driving cars.  In spite of hundreds of 
thousands of accidents on the roads with human drivers 
annually, the much smaller number of accidents involving 
the self-driving cars get major attention [3]. It is quite like-
ly that irrespective of the technology achievements, accept-
ing self-driving cars on our roads is going to take major 
evolution in social acceptance, liability laws and govern-
ment regulations [4].  Similarly, application of AI to medi-
cine [5] also poses many technical and social challenges. 
 Reliability of DL systems can be severely affected by 
their exposure to adversarial attacks. In contrast to the 
cyberattacks (e.g. denial of service) commonly faced by 
traditional systems, the adversarial attacks can change the 
output behavior of the DL systems in unexpected and often 
subtle ways. [6] 
 These examples point to specific weaknesses of the DL 
systems due to their fundamental reliance on data and 
complex statistical models. As will be discussed below, the 
engineering of these systems differs substantially from es-
tablished practices of many decades for traditional soft-
ware systems.  In this paper, we focus on the practical en-
gineering aspects of building reliable software systems us-
ing DL technology available today.  Many concepts also 
apply to broader machine learning systems.  Our goal is to 
explain the current state of the art and identify key chal-
lenges that need to be addressed to make the integration of 
AI into various systems, ranging from business-critical ap-
plications to various government missions, more viable.   
II. Why AI Engineering? 
A.  Traditional Software Systems  
Traditional engineering practices for building complex 
software systems rely on the principles of functional and 
modular decomposition [7]. Program units must have clear 
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boundaries and known expected behaviors at design time.  
A deviation from the expected behavior is the definition of 
a software defect (i.e. bug), which is at the heart of any 
quality management program. These principles are key to 
system lifecycle activities, i.e. design, development, test-
ing, deployment, and maintenance.  Changes in require-
ments, new functions, bug fixes, development activities 
and frequency of software releases are managed in a pro-
cess (e.g., agile, waterfall, etc.) to meet business expecta-
tions.  The software behavior is deterministic and the team 
follows good design practices such as modularity, encapsu-
lations, separation of concerns to keep the software content 
tractable for humans.  There are tools to support various 
activities (e.g. static code analysis, debugging, data flow, 
change management, bug tracking, test harnesses, etc.) 
B.  Deep Learning Systems 
The power of the AI systems lies in their ability to learn 
empirically and adapt incrementally to ever increasing data 
sets without the need for manually written programs. They 
perform tasks that were very difficult to realize before with 
high degrees of realism, because they typically did not in-
clude empirical learning in a systematic way. Several key 
drivers have led to this advancement, thus creating a new 
context for the engineering discussion.   Growing data vol-
umes in search engines, crowdsourcing, social media tag-
ging have increased training examples for learning algo-
rithms. Scalable computing has become an affordable 
commodity for everyone, thanks to multicores, GPUs, and 
clouds. Due to the value added by learning systems, even 
more specialized hardware like Vision Processing Units 
(VPUs) and Tensor Processing Units (TPUs) are being of-
fered. Scalable data and hardware are thus facilitating en-
hancements on the learning algorithms side. As an ex-
ample, combining convolution operators in neural net-
works allows a gradual detection and refinement of image 
features from the concrete towards the abstract, allowing 
practitioners to add refinements as needed.  
These AI systems are not `engineered’ in the traditional 
sense, as described in Section II.A.  Fundamentally, there 
is no requirement or specification document linking inputs 
and outputs of functions; just training data containing ex-
amples of inputs and corresponding outputs.  The AI com-
ponent does the learning via complex neural networks, 
with no guarantees or explanations on the exact functional 
operations.  Programs decide by data on how to behave, i.e. 
“data is the new specification”. Testing such systems using 
the traditional verification techniques simply will not work, 
since there is no description of what the system is supposed 
to do. Added complexity comes from statistical nature of 
the machine learning algorithms which select outputs for 
given inputs typically based on confidence levels and 
hence not in a deterministic way.   
 Personalization of the outputs to match the specific user 
introduces yet another difficulty: the correctness of the 
output can be decided only by the subjectivity of the per-
son looking at it, making a priori generic ‘user acceptance 
tests’ hardly practical as they can only be judged by explic-
it user feedback. Simply put, there is no simple definition 
of a bug! While the technology behind these systems is tru-
ly amazing, introducing new degrees of freedom has unin-
tended consequences and emergent behavior that is largely 
invisible to developers and consumers. Additionally, the 
heuristic properties of programs can change over time as 
system behavior changes due to new patterns of relation-
ships in the training data and continuous learning. 
 While the engineering of traditional software systems 
primarily focused on functionality, usability, reliability and 
operational performance, due to the potential application of 
AI in all walks of life, DL systems invoke a serious social 
concern: trust.  The notion of trust covers a wide range of 
areas, such as human over-sight, robustness, data privacy, 
fairness, ethics, transparency and accountability [8]. 
 Currently, DL components are built by skilled data sci-
entists in a relatively ad hoc fashion using open source li-
braries with very little attention to software engineering 
principles.  The scaling of AI to the larger ecosystem will 
depend critically on how these activities can be performed 
by more people with more engineering discipline and less 
skills. 
C.  Triad of AI: Critical Success Factors 
It is useful to think about building DL systems in terms of 
a triad; an interplay between three factors i.e. data, domain 
context and the AI algorithms (Figure 1).  In this regard, 
algorithms play the role of a ‘shell’. Operation of this shell 
is determined by the actual training data and the semantic 
labeling of the outputs, which has to make sense to the 
humans in the context of the specific domain or an applica-
tion area. Therefore, these three aspects together define the 
necessary conditions and if anyone of them is missing, the 
resulting DL systems are likely to fail. 
Figure 1: The “Triad of AI”: Critical Success Factors  
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 As an example, let us consider a mortgage approval sys-
tem.  The system has to rely on learning algorithms for risk 
assessment, customer data with personal information, and 
domain knowledge on laws, financial guidelines and regu-
lations. This interplay might be different in various coun-
tries as regulations differ. For example, European Union’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [9] requires 
that customers have a right to know how their personal da-
ta is used, which can include decisions made by AI. The 
legal framework also provides constraints to what data can 
be collected in the first place, which has an influence on 
the algorithmic workings of learning systems. 
III. Software Systems for the Government 
Governments have unique responsibilities in serving the 
public and their software systems have to be sensitive to 
wide range of concerns.  National Aeronautics & Space 
Agency (NASA) defines [10] “mission critical” as loss of 
capability leading to possible reduction in mission effec-
tiveness” and “safety-critical” means failure or design error 
could cause a risk to human life.  These definitions can be 
broadly interpreted to provide guidelines for both civilian 
and national defense missions.  In the civilian space, there 
are many departments that can benefit from AI such as 
Treasury, Justice, Health & Human Services, Labor, etc.  
These departments have strong requirements for record 
keeping, fairness, data privacy, transparency of decisions 
and audit of adherence to standard processes.  As for data 
usage, GDPR [9] puts severe restrictions on the use of in-
dividual data for building AI models and their mainte-
nance.  
 In 2018, US Department of Defense published [11] their 
AI strategy with five strategic focus areas. One of them 
was “Scaling AI’s impact across DoD through a common 
foundation that enables decentralized development and ex-
perimentation” that includes “shared data, reusable tools, 
frameworks, and standards, and cloud and edge services”.  
In another report from the Office of the Director of Nation-
al Intelligence (ODNI) [12], on Augmenting Intelligence 
using Machines (AIM) initiative, explicit discussion of AI 
assurance included the importance of data engineering, the 
need for a robust and sustainable software, initial and con-
tinuous performance evaluation to match the mission goals, 
the need for rigorous testing regimes, concept drift in mod-
els and dealing with possibilities of adversarial attacks on 
models and data.      
 A key concept in the deployment of software systems in 
the US government agencies is the use of Technology 
Readiness Levels (TRL) [13] to assess the maturity of the 
systems for mission use.  Software components also re-
quire certification under Federal Information Security 
Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) as defined by the Na-
tional Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publi-
cation 800-53 [14].  To complicate matters further, there 
are various clearance levels for security and data, and the 
related AI artifacts have to be dealt with appropriately. 
There may also be clearance levels required for people and 
facilities to execute the project that can place constraints 
on skill levels of staff and their roles. 
 In either civilian or national defense context, the AI has 
to fit into a larger system with multiple endpoints and es-
tablished processes.  The need for low barrier for Human-
Machine collaboration is paramount.  An unexpected or in-
appropriate behavior of AI supporting a government mis-
sion can be disastrous. 
IV. AI Engineering Lifecycle Activities 
For the foreseeable future, mission critical systems may 
need one or more DL components along with traditional AI 
functions (e.g. planning, rule based), non-AI functions (e.g. 
traditional analytics, reporting) and IT components (e.g. 
access control).   Figure 2 shows the various engineering 
lifecycle activities for an application with one DL compo-
nent that supports a task required for a mission (e.g. object 
identification).  There are two overlapping sets of activi-
ties: one set for the application lifecycle supporting the 
mission (circle on the left) and another set for the DL com-
ponent supporting the application (circle on the right), with 
the circle in the middle representing the intersection be-
tween the two. The DL model lifecycle may go through 
many more iterations before delivering a model suitable to 
support the mission task.  Project planning has to include 
these aspects when deciding on resources and schedules.  
This section describes these activities and highlights the 
impact of DL components.  
A.  Application Lifecycle 
The AI application lifecycle consists of traditional software 
construction activities, except that it is influenced by the 
inclusion of the DL component(s) for one or more tasks.  
Going clockwise, the activities and their purpose (starting 
top left in Figure 2) are as follows:  
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Application Requirements: These requirements are gen-
erally determined by the mission goals and system expecta-
tions and are independent of choices on AI. It may be 
worthwhile to capture specific concerns about robustness, 
security, bias, ethics, human level explanation and system 
transparency explicitly.  Such constraints will help avoid 
the inappropriate use of DL components.  
Application Design:  This activity requires careful consid-
eration of which task in the application can be reliably exe-
cuted by a DL component.  If the output of the DL task has 
a high consequence (e.g. human life) and the confidence in 
the DL output is low, then the task is not suitable for AI.  
Conversely, if the output has low consequence and high 
confidence, then it is an ideal task for AI.  A critical re-
quirement is the availability of data of adequate quality and 
quantity [15] before a DL model building process is at-
tempted. Rule-based checkers can help monitor DL com-
ponent outputs and their impact on mission or safety objec-
tives.  
Human-Machine Interaction:  System usage model 
moves from “humans using the machines” to one of “hu-
man-machine collaboration” (i.e. augmenting human intel-
ligence), thus impacting human experience and productivi-
ty directly. AI based applications also leverage additional 
forms of human input (i.e., unstructured text, gestures, 
speech).  The decision on which interaction paradigms to 
use depends on the quality of the machine cognition of the 
human input [16] as well as on the ability for a graceful re-
covery in the event of its cognitive failures. 
Application-Model Intersection:  There are two roles for 
this activity: (1) Defining model requirements and ex-
pected quality metrics such as accuracy, runtime perfor-
mance, robustness, explainability, etc. and (2) Create black 
box testing to verify if the model indeed satisfies the model 
requirements.  These activities need to be carried out by 
persons with a good understanding of the mission require-
ments.  To test the model outputs, separate data sets (i.e. 
hold-out sets) are required that are not actually used in the 
model building process [17] and that the data distribution 
in the hold-out set represents the mission requirements. If 
the model does not meet the mission requirements, the de-
velopment process has to go back to the DL model lifecy-
cle activities for improvements. 
DL Model Lifecycle:  Current best practices in creating 
machine learning applications are discussed in [17, 18].  
Important activities are:  
• Acquire / prepare data:  Raw data acquisition may in-
volve licensing, security, privacy issues as well as proper 
governance after the acquisition.  DL modeling currently 
requires large amounts of labeled data that may have to 
be acquired from domain experts or crowd sourcing at 
considerable cost. As is known in the statistics commu-
nity, nearly 80% of the effort in a data project is related 
to data preparation.  For AI applications, proper prepara-
tion is needed to avoid bias and ensure fairness and trust. 
Feature extraction is a critical task in this process, which 
can help remove redundant data dimensions, unwanted 
noise, and other properties that degrade model perfor-
mance. This topic will be revisited in Section V. 
• Build/Train/Test/Debug Model: This step aims to pro-
duce the best model meeting the mission requirements 
with the available data. In practice, various programming 
frameworks (e.g. TensorFlow, PyTorch, Scikit-Learn, 
etc.) are used to create the model code.  These frame-
Figure 2:  Engineering lifecycle with one deep learning component 
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works typically provide some tool support for the coding 
process.   However, as should be evident, even if the 
model code does not have any errors in it, that does not 
mean that the model is good for the mission purpose.  
Another important step in building DL models is the 
separation of training data and validation data so that the 
model’s ability to generalize can be evaluated accurately 
[17].  Cross-validation is a standard practice, where typi-
cally 70% of the data is used for training and 30% of the 
data is used for validation. This helps to tune model pa-
rameters, select data features, and tweak the learning al-
gorithm. The data needs to be drawn from the same dis-
tribution for the training and validation sets.  Unfortu-
nately, debugging of the DL models is complex [19] 
since DL behavior can be the result of the model-
inferred code and the underlying training data.  Breck et 
al [20] discussed 28 specific tests and monitoring needs, 
based on experience with a wide range of production ML 
systems at Google.  
• Model Dev/Ops:  When the model is deemed adequate, it 
has to be integrated into the actual software application. 
Black box testing evaluates if the model is “good 
enough” for deployment or suggests a lifecycle restart.  
The Dev/Ops activity also needs to keep the model and 
training data versions in sync so that any changes to the 
model in the future can be adequately tracked.  
Application Composition:  Tested DL components are in-
tegrated into applications as black box services, much like 
other micro-services in use today. This task may combine 
other non-DL services to create a complete software appli-
cation product.   
Application Testing: Application level testing is similar to 
the User Acceptance Testing in traditional software devel-
opment. However, it has a few twists: There are specific 
challenges involving testing for any system behavior re-
sulting from customizations and automated sensing of an 
individual’s profile. Evaluators need to execute the appli-
cation in relevant target environments with their resource 
constraints (e.g. portable devices on the edge, etc.). Results 
on robustness, security, bias, ethics, system transparency 
etc. need to be documented and addressed.    
Application Deployment/DevOps:  The absence of the 
concept of a defect in AI systems challenges traditional no-
tions of success and failure in integration testing and de-
ployment. In addition, data properties fed into DL systems 
can change after deployment. Thus, new quality assess-
ment techniques are required for such contexts. We discuss 
this further in Section V. 
Monitoring: In traditional software systems, monitoring 
had mainly two purposes: (i) understanding user behavior 
to improve system design (e.g. A/B testing) (ii) anticipat-
ing potential performance issues that require maintenance 
upgrades.  However, many systems can function quite ade-
quately without such monitoring. By contrast, in AI sys-
tems monitoring is not an option, but a required activity. 
This is because DL model behavior can drift with time due 
to changes in the input data and the data distributions in the 
deployment.  The specific details on what to monitor and 
how often will depend on the specific use cases and mis-
sion goals. We return to discuss drift further in Section V. 
Continuous Learning & Evolution: This activity aims to 
modify the DL model to match the mission requirements as 
data assumptions change.  One common challenge with 
this goal is that the data collected during deployment is not 
‘labeled’ (i.e. the correct output is unknown) and hence not 
directly usable for model re-training. Techniques such as 
active learning [21] can be used to get users to provide the 
labels directly; semi-automated approaches combine auto-
mated labeling and human validation. As Microsoft Tay 
bot example [1] demonstrated, continuous model learning 
has its own challenges in validation.   
 V.  Current Challenges in AI Engineering 
Various authors have addressed the topic of engineering 
challenges in DL systems. A recent summary is presented 
by Khomh et al. [22]. Masuda et al. [23] performed a lit-
erature survey on key problems faced by machine learning 
applications and identified potential software engineering 
approaches to solve these problems.    
  
A. Related Work  
     Technical debt. Skully et al. [24] concluded that DL 
applications carry significant technical debt. Due to lack of 
clear abstraction boundaries with specific intended behav-
iors, the behavior of a machine learning component can be 
summarized as “Change Anything - Changes Everything”. 
Data dependencies are more costly than code dependen-
cies.  Systems can also become overly complex due to glue 
code needed to support various models, data processing, 
and ubiquitous experimentation. Maintenance is expensive 
due to inevitable changes in data and models with time.   
     AI Development is different. Amershi et al. [25] re-
ported on a study of software teams at Microsoft as they 
develop AI-based applications. They concluded with three 
key observations: (1) managing the AI data life cycle is 
harder than other types of software engineering, (2) model 
customization and reuse require very different skills that 
are not typically found in software development teams, and 
(3) AI components are more difficult to handle than tradi-
tional software components due to the difficulty of isolat-
ing error behavior.  Another study at Microsoft by Kim et 
al. [26] looked, in detail, at the technical and cultural chal-
lenges of data scientists being a part of software develop-
ment teams.  
     Tracking Complexity. Arpteg et al. [27] studied seven 
AI projects and corroborated many of the observations al-
ready made in this paper and related work.  They high-
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lighted the difficulties in tracking the various experiments 
with contextual information and the dependencies across 
the various hardware and software components.  They also 
point to the practical problem of estimating the effort 
needed to build an acceptable DL model for project plan-
ning.   
     Maturity and scalability. Akkiraju et al. [28] presented 
an AI maturity model and a set of best practices from client 
experiences of building large scale real-world machine 
learning models at IBM. 
B. Managing DL Performance Drift 
 Let us consider the example of identifying objects (e.g. 
cats) in images with a DL component.  Based on the results 
of our testing on the training set, (say) we expect an accu-
racy of identifying a cat in the interval [89%, 90%] with a 
probability of 99%.  However, at deployment time we find 
out that the actual accuracy “in the wild” is 70%, indicat-
ing that a drift has occurred. 
There is a difference between model drift and data drift 
[29].  Data drift denotes a change in the data distribution 
during deployment compared to the distribution during the 
training phase of the DL model.   The basic theory of ma-
chine learning (e.g. Probably Approximately Correct learn-
ing [30] ) does not expect a data drift.  While the data drift 
is necessary for the model performance drift, but it is not 
sufficient.  It is quite possible that a DL model is not sensi-
tive to the changes in the data distribution. Such a behavior 
is indeed, desirable.  In fact, one can design the DL model 
to have more stable behavior by introducing anticipated da-
ta changes into the design of the neural network [31].  In 
our example, if we had enough instances of white and 
black cat images in the training set, the DL model accuracy 
may become immune to changes in the proportion of white 
and black cats at the deployment time.    
How quickly and accurately can the model output drift 
be detected when data drift occurs?  The answer to this 
question is complicated by the following three factors: (i) 
The curse of high dimensions.  Since typical data used in 
learning has high dimensions, finding the difference be-
tween two distributions is a hard problem. (ii) Data at the 
deployment time is typically not labeled.   As a result, di-
rect measurement of the DL model performance is not pos-
sible. (iii) Repeated measurement of the DL performance 
requires care. Typically, we need to use proper experi-
mental design that requires advanced sequential test analy-
sis or stopping time techniques to retain statistical power. 
In short, to avoid model drift issues, one has to rely on 
proper engineering. In the model building process, clear 
separation of training and validation data which are sam-
pled from the same distribution, is necessary.  In addition, 
careful selection of black box test data is critical, so that it 
represents the expected data at deployment time accurately. 
C.  Managing the Data Workflow 
Traditional software development has mature processes to 
capture relevant artifacts (i.e. requirements, designs, code 
versions, test cases, deployment data, etc.) for future use.  
In contrast, the process for developing DL components 
may not allow the permanent storage of the training data as 
a critical artifact. In practice, this may be due to very large 
data sets, limited data access, or contract/license terms that 
prohibit data use beyond the training period. Data can also 
vary wildly over time (e.g. Twitter data) making the data 
capture less relevant for later use.  If it is impractical to 
capture and preserve all the data used to train and test an 
AI system, developers and auditors will be unable to re-
produce or post-audit the models and components that are 
vital to the operation of mission critical AI applications. 
 Data preparation is the most underrated task in DL mod-
el building. It holds the key to a better and more reliable 
model building.  Data preparation affects the final predic-
tive accuracy, generally even more than the actual model-
ing step! Like modeling, it also contains parameters which 
should be tuned.  Currently, data preparation for DL is a 
“black art” giving rise to many conceptual errors in prac-
tice.  Data preparation must be understood as a process that 
must be optimized, cross-validated, and deployed jointly 
with data modeling in order to ensure proper applicability.    
  Figure 3 represents a typical data workflow [32] in a deep 
learning project.  The provenance of the data sources and 
their trustworthiness are not typically questioned by the da-
ta scientists. They often make ad hoc assumptions and data 
transformations in the process, which are not recorded for 
reproducibility.    Thus, tools are critical to help with the 
data workflow tasks shown in Figure 3.  Gradual progress 
is being made in this area.  For example, Snorkel [33], is 
an opensource system to build and manage training da-
tasets programmatically. It currently focuses on three key 
operations: labeling data (e.g. using heuristic rules or dis-
tant supervision techniques), transforming data (e.g. data 
augmentation and capturing invariances) and slicing data 
into different critical subsets.   Khurana et al. [34] used re-
inforcement learning on past examples to learn a policy 
across data sets to automate feature engineering efficiently.  
With One Button Machine, Lam et al. [35] automated fea-
Figure 3: Typical Data Workflow 
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ture discovery in relational databases with impressive per-
formances in Kaggle competitions. More examples to au-
tomate data workflow can be found in Ref. [32]. 
D.  Ensuring Model Correctness Across the 
Lifecycle 
In the absence of a clear definition of a software defect, 
how do we manage the correctness of a DL system across 
the software lifecycle?  Hestness et al. performed a careful 
empirical study [36] for a few different datasets and found 
that the error in generalization of DL models decreased as 
a power law with the training data size.  Kendal and Gal 
[37] used an alternative highly theoretical Bayesian ap-
proach to calculate uncertainties in DL models, since the 
deep learning models themselves are not able to represent 
uncertainty and they do not deal with the lifecycle aspects.  
Perera et al. [38] addressed the need for analyzing and pre-
paring the data to match the accuracy of the expected mod-
el accuracy.       
 One potential path is to augment the deterministic ap-
proach for measuring the correctness in traditional soft-
ware with a statistical approach.   Since DL is a statistical 
technique, the measurements have to reflect that property.  
Thus, techniques similar to Statistical Process Control 
(SPC), commonly used in manufacturing, should be con-
sidered for DL systems.  As with traditional software de-
velopment, it is important to define a consistent set of met-
rics across all the activities of a DL application to track the 
correctness of the application as it moves through the 
lifecycle.  These metrics have to capture the variance of the 
outputs for given inputs, as well as the variance of the out-
puts for different input data sets in a normalized manner to 
facilitate meaningful comparisons. The overall variance of 
the DL model outputs is likely to be a function of the vari-
ance of the input data distributions and the specific trans-
formations performed by the DL models.  We need a way 
to capture this variance in a practically useful and con-
sistent manner across the lifecycle activities.    
E.  AI Certification and Benchmarking 
Component-based software engineering has become the 
norm in building software systems, achieving significant 
reuse.  Given the abundance of AI services and compo-
nents (i.e. algorithms, libraries, frameworks) available 
from open source and commercial offerings, how can the 
government (for that matter, any one) absorb the technolo-
gy easily and quickly to support mission-critical needs?  
Particularly, open source components come with ‘use as is’ 
terms, clearly implying significant risk to the user. Then, 
there is the matter of ‘Trust’ in AI systems we mentioned 
earlier. The purpose of this topic here is to provoke a dis-
cussion on what dimensions capture the risk of the user and 
how to mitigate that by some manner of certification ac-
ceptable to the community at large.  The concept of a Fact 
Sheet [39] is very appealing and much like food labeling, 
can provide information on the various dimensions that 
matter to the user.  For example, these can include accura-
cy (e.g., F1 score for classification tasks), fairness (bias 
quantification in the model outputs for certain input data 
distributions), lineage (representation of provenance of the 
data used to train the model and clarity over the ownership 
of the model), or robustness (a measure of resistance to ad-
versarial attacks).  
 As deep learning is data driven, AI component certifica-
tion will also require standard data benchmarks and com-
petitions in the community in order to be able to compare 
component metrics on common baselines. Setting up 
community/industry-wide data benchmarks for AI will be a 
necessity that compares to past efforts in benchmarking 
CPUs (e.g., SPEC), parallel computers (e.g., TOP500, 
PARSEC, parallel I/O), SAT solving, chess, and other as-
pects. The results of AI benchmarks will facilitate an un-
derstanding of the Pareto frontiers that show how compo-
nents perform in various dimensions, what their “Technol-
ogy Readiness Level” is, what their individual tradeoffs 
are, and how well their internal functionality complies with 
regulations (e.g. GDPR, FISMA). 
VI. Conclusion 
This paper explores the topic of AI engineering required to 
build reliable deep learning-based software systems.  We 
discuss the impact of the introduction of deep learning 
components on the traditional software lifecycle activities.  
Considerable challenges remain in the scaling of already 
proven deep learning technology to real-world systems that 
are mission-critical or safety-critical. We identify four key 
engineering areas that need breakthroughs: (i) techniques 
for managing deep learning model performance drift dur-
ing deployment (ii) tool support to improve the data work-
flow tasks in the model building process (iii) methods to 
measure the correctness of models across their lifecycle 
that augments or replaces the current ‘defect’ based quality 
management system for software (iv) certification process-
es that will enhance the adoption of commercial or open 
source components into mission critical applications. With 
additional progress in these areas, AI can become a more 
trustworthy partner in mission critical applications. 
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